On December 23, 2006, I received the Louisiana STATE CIRCUIT APPEAL COURT’s “opinion” for state case docket number 04-12090. In case my well-being is in jeopardy, this is my rushed rebuttal to that ‘opinion’.

INITIAL MATTERS

I. The 04-12090 lawsuit was filed on August 20, 2004. (It was filed at state court prior to my reporting to the federal court chambers of Judge Lance Africk that same day for the state DEBT COLLECTION case docket number 03-14010 –which Herschel Adcock, a defendant in the 14010 case, UNTIMELY removed 32-days late to federal court by giving a one paragraph removal notice to me, but a 12-paragraph removal notice to federal court by creating 2 different Notices of Removal for the 14010 case.)

II. The named defendants in this lawsuit would have been joined to the 03-14010 debt collection case if federal Magistrate Judge Chasez had not denied me leave to amend that federal case. She said the claims I sought to add were purely state law claims; so I filed those claims in state court prior to final judgment of the federal debt collection case. Clearly, the debt collection case was not res judicata of the foreclosure case filed by Herschel Adcock in which I sought an executory process injunction which Medley denied. The case of The fact that Judge Medley did not realize that his October 20, 2003 denial of an injunction hearing is not a “judgment” does not make it a judgment. For Medley’s decision to be a judgment, Adcock’s executory proceeding should have been made an ordinary proceeding. Moreover, since an injunction hearing is not really a litigation, it is not possible for there to be evidence of litigating any of Barbara Jackson’s damage claims at the injunction hearing before Judge Medley. Barbara Jackson’s lawsuit for debt collection damages was different lawsuit which was never allotted to Judge Medley, but instead to Judge Yada Magee; then removed to federal court federal court jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE 4TH CIRCUIT’S OPINION

A. Misguidedly, Paragraph 2 of The Circuit’s Opinion States:

“Ms. Jackson initially filed litigation seeking to enjoin a foreclosure proceeding by GE Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., against property she co-owned with her daughter. Ms. Jackson’s complaint was (and continues to be) that Judge Medley (in whose court the foreclosure proceeding was), Sheriff Valteau, and the Sheriff’s Office improperly and / or fraudulently conspired to appoint Mr. Doley as curator for her daughter. On October 20, 2003, the trial court denied Ms. Jackson’s petition for an injunction to stop the foreclosure, specifically noting in written reasons for judgment that the plaintiff/mortgagee had followed all the procedures required by Louisiana law for an executory proceeding. Although Ms. Jackson did not appeal this judgment timely, she later sought reversal of the judgment by filing a writ application in the Louisiana Supreme Court, which application was denied on January 5, 2005.”

B. Irrefutable facts which patently impeach the misguided paragraph

1. In the first place, “initially filed litigation” is completely false. The truth is that in September 2002 Herschel Adcock initially filed executory process state court case number 02-14840 in Judge Medley’s court; and Barbara Jackson filed a request for an injunction under that same case. A year later, in September 2003 when Barbara “initially filed” a Debt Collection lawsuit under state court docket number 03-14010, Judge Yada Magee, was the judge. However, Medley crafted his injunction denial to have it appear as being a “judgment” on the 03-14010 case that was not even in his court; glaringly, the only matter in Medley’s court was Adcock’s executory process case which Medley denied an injunction. Establishing that fact exposes the reality that “litigation” of the Debt Collection state case that Barbara filed was never “litigated” through Judge Medley’s court. The two cases are entirely different lawsuits! Thus, not only is the “opinion” sentence, “initially filed litigation seeking to enjoin a foreclosure” untrue and misleading, the sentence appears deliberately vague! A mere perusal of scores and scores of court opinions and case law, shows there has never been such without referring to a case number to provide the reader with identity of which case the opinion is referencing. In particular, it appears especially vague, unprofessional, and incredible for a court of this caliber to write words: “initially filed litigation” instead of supply (i) the name that litigation, (ii) the date and (iii) case number of whatever litigation the high court is talking about. As such, inaccurate information is difficult to pinpoint. By contrast, Barbara Jackson herewith is furnishing the case numbers, so any reader can follow along, and can substantiate the facts by the case record.

2. Also to be reconsidered is this Circuit’s statement: “On October 20, 2003, the trial court denied Ms. Jackson’s petition for an injunction to stop the foreclosure . . .specifically noting in reasons for judgment. . . ” At the outset, the only hearing with “the trial judge,” Judge Medley, was Ms. Jackson’s injunction request under the same case number, and in response to Herschel Adcock’s executory process lawsuit. Moreover, for good reason, a trial court’s decision on an injunction request cannot and should not be labeled a “judgment.” That reason being, a trial judge’s grant or denial of an injunction an in executory process is discretionary! Notwithstanding, when a trial court renders a judgment, the ruling to be applied is not applicable from the judge’s discretion, but rather the ruling must be applicable to statutes and laws –after fact finding and weighing of evidence!

3. Perhaps this Circuit was unaware case number 02-14840 was Judge Medley’s injunction denial ruling was based on Judge Medley’s biased discretion AND NOT BASED ON ANY LITIGATION. In fact, not even Herschel Adcock, nor the Sheriff’s Office were even present for that injunction hearing. With these facts, surely, it is recognizable that this Circuit has confused Judge Medley’s injunction denial with a judgment on the merits, regardless that Medley’s gave “written reasons,” it was only an injunction hearing that Medley mislabeled his decision as a “judgment.” With all due respect, as this court clearly knows, an injunction hearing, is not the same as a trial on the merits. In fact, that particular hearing only lasted 5 minutes. Due to the clear fact that that litigation was never assigned to Judge Medley, nor ever adjudicated Judge Medley’s court, obviously, there can be no such thing as a judgment for Jackson’s debt collection case from Medley.

4. Further, when the 03-14010 debt collection case became removed to federal court, it was manifestly erroneously for any court to declare that the sole issue which could have possibly come from Judge Medley, “the trial judge” on October 2003 was the injunction denial. Judge Medley did not understand it was not a judgment, and named it a judgment due to the fact, that the decision to grant or deny an executory process injunction is discretionary. BECAUSE MEDLEY’S INEPT OR CORRUPT LABEL OF HIS INJUNCTION DENIAL AS BEING A “JUDGMENT” MADE IT APPEAR OTHER THAN WHAT IT WAS, AND BECAUSE MEDLEY SUPPLIED HIS “WRITTEN REASONS” AFTER CASE 03-14010 HAD BEEN FILED, IT GAVE THE APPEAR THAT MEDLEY ADJUDICATED THOSE DEBT COLLECTION CLAIMS. To the contrary, Medley only provided the language in his “judgment” ruling that was beneficial for use by attorneys William Detweiler and Herschel Adcock. Afterwards, when Adcock and Detweiler deceptively and untimely removed case 03-14010 from Judge Yada Magee to federal court, Medley’s “judgment” became GLORIFIED and IMPLEMENTED by Judge Africk and later by Judge Dodd to declare Medley’s injunction denial as being the same as trial of the merits of any of Barbara Jackson’s claims.

5. As mentioned, this instant case is case number 04-12090. This instant case was filed in state court as a result of not be granted leave in federal court to amend case number 03-14010 which became federal case 03-3369. As more fully discussed below, the case of Richard D. Barnett v. Logan Nichols, 824 So. 2d 485 (La.App.3 Cir. 2002), not until there has been a trial of the merits of a plaintiff’s cause of action, can a matter be deemed tried by the court.

6. Moreover, on April 5, 2006, this Circuit’s reversal of a different ruling rendered by Judge Lloyd Medley refutes the opinion this Circuit rendered for Barbara Jackson. The opinion in the MERS v. Wells , 2005-0795, (La.App. 4 Cir. 04/05/06) case of proves why Barbara’s appeal of Judge Kollin’s decision for case 04-12090 is not frivolous, and proves why Jackson is entitled to her day in court for her case under docket number 04-12090. Furthermore, the most salient allegation in the 04-12090 case is the misfeasance of Sheriff Paul Valteau’s Department (Detweiler’s client) with regard to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1292 (sheriff returns). IN FACT, THE SHERIFF OFFICE’S VIOLATION OF article 1292 could be the reason why CT Corporation Systems became associated-in-fact with the real estate mortgage fraud federal racketeering case number 06-2435. Moreover, contrary to the 4th Circuit’s misinformation opinion, Barbara Jackson never appealed Medley’s October 2003. This Circuit’s ruling in MERS v. Wells:

“Both parties cite the case of Abadie v. Cassidy, 581 So. 2d 657 (La. 1991). In that case plaintiff sued the owner of an adjoining lot. Each lot was burdened with a drainage servitude. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging defendants were obstructing the servitude and causing damage to plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief. The trial court sustained defendants’ dilatory exception of improper cumulation of actions and dismissed plaintiffs’ suit after determining any defects in the pleadings could not be removed by amendment. The court of appeal, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the portion of the trial court judgment maintaining the dilatory exception of improper cumulation. The court of appeal relied upon People of the Living God v. Chantilly Corp., 211 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1968), and held that cumulation was improper because the action for damages and the action for injunctive relief employ different forms of procedure. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed both lower courts stating:
“The requirement that all of the actions employ the same form of procedure refers merely to whether each of the cumulative actions employ either ordinary, executory or summary procedure. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 463, comment (a); Johnson v. Marvin Cutrer Contractor, Inc., 348 So. 2d 1256 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1977); Tate, Work of the Appellate Courts-1968-1969, 30 La.L.Rev. 286, 287 (1969). In the present case, the two cumulated actions are the claim for damages and the claim for injunctive relief. The principal demand for a permanent injunction is determined on its merits only after a full trial under ordinary process. See Smith v. West Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 373 So. 2d 488 (La.1979); Haughton Elevator Division v. State, 367 So. 2d 1161 (La.1979); Equitable Petroleum v. Central Transmission, Inc., 431 So. 2d 1084 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1983); Tate, Work of the Appellate Courts-1968-1969, supra.FN* Thus, both of the actions sought to be cumulated *658 in the present case are triable by ordinary process and thus employ the same “form” of procedure.

“FN* It should be noted that the action for a preliminary injunction employs summary procedure. However, this action is ancillary to the principal demand for a permanent injunction, in order to prevent irreparable injury during the pendency of the principal demand. La.Code Civ.P. art. 3601; Tate, Work of the Appellate Courts-1968-1969, supra.

“Additionally, People of the Living God v. Chantilly Corporation, the case relied upon by the court of appeal, has been called “a casebook example of how not to decide a cumulation problem”. Tate, Work of the Appellate Courts-1968-1969, id. In explaining the error of the Chantilly court Judge Tate stated:

“In holding the cumulation improper, the court pointed out that a jury trial was available for the damage action, but not for the injunction action (no one had sought trial by jury), as well as certain differences in the treatment of appeals, such as that a permanent injunction may not be appealed suspensively as of right, while the damage action may. Citing a pre-1960 decision, the court concluded that the two actions could not be cumulated ‘because of the complications that would result.’ The court’s refusal to permit cumulation because of these (exaggerated) procedural difficulties ignores the Code criteria authorizing cumulation of two or more actions against the same defendant. The court should not have refused cumulation when the Code requirements were met; its reliance upon pre-1960 case decisions overlooks the intent of the Code to overrule legislatively the pre-1960 jurisprudence to the contrary. Tate, Work of the Appellate Courts-1968-1969, id. at 288.

“Accordingly, we find that the requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 462 have been satisfied and the court of appeal erred in relying upon People of the Living God v. Chantilly, supra, to prevent cumulation.

“For the reasons assigned above, the writ is granted, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

“Using the Abadie rationale, the trial court here was incorrect in dismissing all of Mr. Wells’ action, and not giving him an opportunity to amend his pleadings. At the very least, Mr. Wells’ damage claim could have been severed from the other claims and assigned a new number, if the trial court felt that it did not meet the criteria for cumulation as articulated in La. C.C.P. Art. 462.
“For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
* * * * *

7. Further, another case which is exactly on point with Barbara’s 04-12090 case even more not only shows that this appeal is not frivolous, but case of Richard D. Barnett v. Logan Nichols, 824 So. 2d 485 (La.App.3 Cir. 2002) proves why Judge Kollin’s dismissal of Barbara Jackson’s case should be reversed:

“In 1991, Plaintiff, Richard D. Barnett filed a civil action in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court Lafayette Parish, under suit No. 91-5553. In 1996, Barnett filed a lawsuit under docket number C-1116-96 in the Thirty-First Judicial District, Jefferson Davis Parish. When the 1996 Jefferson Davis Parish case was dismissed by a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the 1991 Lafayette Parish case was dismissed because the court granted exception of res judicata based on the 1996 summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed both judgments, and the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court dismissals of both cases and remanded those cases for trial. See Barnett v. Nichols, 748 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 3 Cir.1999); consolidated with Marsh Engineering, Inc. and Barnett v. Parker, et al, 748 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1999).

“In1998, while Barnett’s state cases were pending, Carl Warden filed a Declaratory complaint in federal court. Barnett answered the declaratory complaint with counterclaims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (”RICO”). In response to Barnett’s RICO counterclaim, Warden filed, and was granted his Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion because Barnett’s RICO claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations when commenced in 1991 when Barnett filed initial lawsuit.

“Afterwards, Nichols filed a res judicata exception, whereby Nichols contended that the dismissal of Barnett’s RICO counter-claim in federal court was res judicata to the1996 lawsuit. On April 16, 2000, the state court sustained Nichols’ exception of res judicata and dismissed Barnett’s claims with prejudice. Barnett’s appeal of the April 2000 judgment resulted in yet another Louisiana Third Circuit reversal, of the erroneous dismissal of Barnett’s two state cases as explained in Barnett v. Nichols,824 So. 2d 485 (La.App.3 Cir. 2002). The Third Circuit excellently unsnarled the theorems about what is and is not res judicata. In addition, the ruling in Barnett v. Nichols illuminates the reality that, just as Barnett’s RICO cause begin in to accrue in 1991, a RICO lawsuit often involves claims from a prior lawsuit in order to show a pattern of conduct. As such, a defendant’s contention of claim preclusion in a RICO lawsuit is untenable. However, the gravamen of what the court in Barnett teaches is as follows:

“In the instant case, it is clear that the first two prerequisites have been established. The parties in the state suit are the same as those in the counterclaim filed by Nichols in the federal suit. The prior judgment of dismissal was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

“Whether the third prerequisite has been met is less clear. Under the provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41(b), a dismissal on an exception of prescription is considered to be a final judgment on the merits. However, we note that the aim of claim preclusion is to avoid multiple suits on identical entitlements or obligations between the same parties, accompanied, as they would be, by the redetermination of identical issues of duty and breach and will apply to bar a subsequent action on res judicata principles where parties have previously litigated the same claim to a valid judgment. Reeder, 623 So. 2d 1268.

“In the instant case, the substantive issues have been neither litigated nor determined. Therefore, we do not find, under the facts before us, that dismissal of a federal claim based on prescription precludes a pending state claim. At the time the RICO claim was filed, the state court claims had been dismissed by the trial court and were pending appeal. Those claims were not reinstated until this court rendered its opinions, reversing the trial court, on October 13, 1999, after the RICO claim was dismissed. The actions are in different judicial systems. These actions are not subject to the same prescriptive periods. The state claim was timely filed.

“We, therefore, do not find the defendant has established res judicata applies so as to dismiss the state claim because we do not find a judgment of dismissal based on prescription, under these facts, to be a “final judgment on the merits” as contemplated by the jurisprudence.

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8. A person is not required to appeal a discretionary injunction denial! A mindless person would bother filing an appeal which would be moot by the time the appeal becomes heard. Moreover, as explained in the cases above as well as in a person is not confined to a mere injunction when debt collection violations, simulated real estate sales, lesion moiety, truth in lending rights of rescission or any other lawful right exists. The bottom line is that the effects of an injunction hearing should not affect a person’s right to challenge what he or she believes is wrongful –even when the trial judge at an injunction hearing labels his discretionary ruling for which he holds a 5-minute injunction hearing and thinks his ruling is a judgment.

9. Indeed, Barbara’s injunction contained factual statements of damages and debt collection allegations as such information is requisite for injunction request to indicate possibilities of success on the merits, but the injunction is not the trying of the merits, even when a judge’s written reasons extols the party receiving the favorable injunction decision.

10. Not only does the 4th Circuit go out of its way to obscure the identities of parties in the 04-12090 case, as well as the facts, allegations urged against debt collectors, for several years, statistics show that in New Orleans, debt collection lawsuits rarely incur FACTFACTING and WEIGHING OF EVIDENCE, because those cases are immediately thrown out or the issues get distorted (like when Medley throw out the case of MERS v. Wells, and there was the 4-year wait for appellate decision which reverse that dismissal). The bottom line is that a court must allow a plaintiff his / her day in court when the lawsuit states ANY claim which relief can be granted.

a. In this renown New Orleans city of corruption and cronyism and poverty, it is striking that DEBT COLLECTION ABUSE is rampant and apparently condoned by courts such as Judge Medley’s. Additionally, it is a given that where economic hardship (poverty) abounds, debt collectors thrive. Moreover, even prior to Katrina, Louisiana was second only to Mississippi respecting poverty in the USA. Thus, when unscrupulous debt collectors can thrive –and when mortgage creditors benefit from debt collectors’ flipping properties– as a result of corrupt and inept court rulings, Louisiana is a fantastic place for corrupt debt collection business –especially when people’s medical bills enable Adcock’s collection corporation to capitalize on people’s misfortune and devastate families. The Federal Reserve System has sounded repeated alarms, enacted Consumer Protection laws (15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq.), and provided extensive guidelines to circumvent the myriads of effects from unfair debt collection. In fact, the Federal Reserve has made it unlawful to violate debt collection laws “regardless whether a valid debt actually exists.” However, due to combinations such as Freddie Mac’s repeated securities violations and unlawful campaign contributing and lobbying, the unscrupulous debt collection business with court approval, and attorneys like William Detweiler and Brett Furr, who apparently earn a good living amassing legal fees associated with collection abuse and mortgage creditors’ flippings and frauds. Lastly, even if someone had the limited capability of perceiving Barbara Jackson’s controversy as merely being due to being denied an injunction (but Medley’s denial called a “judgment”), what limitations must there be on a person’s mental capacities to not recognize flagrant improprieties surrounding all those properties that Sheriff Valteau transferred to the debt collectors?

C. These following statements from this Circuit’s opinion are not only amazingly not factual, but impossible to corroborate: “Ms. Jackson initially filed litigation seeking to enjoin a foreclosure proceeding by GE Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., against property she co-owned with her daughter. Ms. Jackson’s complaint was (and continues to be) that Judge Medley (in whose court the foreclosure proceeding was), Sheriff Valteau, and the Sheriff’s Office improperly and / or fraudulently conspired to appoint Mr. Doley as curator for her daughter. On October 20, 2003, the trial court denied Ms. Jackson’s petition for an injunction to stop the foreclosure, specifically noting in written reasons for judgment that the plaintiff/mortgagee had followed all the procedures required by Louisiana law for an executory proceeding. Although Ms. Jackson did not appeal this judgment timely, she later sought reversal of the judgment by filing a writ application in the Louisiana Supreme Court, which application was denied on January 5, 2005.”
1. Any reasonable person would believe the above statement is saying that (a) Barbara Jackson initially filed litigation seeking to enjoin a foreclosure proceeding. (b) “Her litigation was –and continues to be that Judge Medley, Valteau, and the Sheriff’s Office improperly and fraudulently conspired to appoint Doley. On 10/20/2003 with written reasons, Medley denied the “petition for injunction. Jackson did not appeal, but sought reversal by apply for a writ that was denied.
a. Despite any interpretations of the above convoluted “opinion,” whatever Ms. Jackson initially litigated and whatever case was actually in Judge Medley’s court, it is undeniable that the sole issue that was decided by Judge Medley regarding Barbara Jackson, was the sole issue of an injunction, NOT the merits of ANY of Jackson’s claims.

b. Such a summation from the Fourth Circuit of lower court proceedings absent any case numbers whatsoever –and the Fourth Circuit’s unsubstantiated conjecture that IT “CONTINUES TO BE,” as if a reader should merely accept the Circuit’s language and words without being able to refer to ANY court record, is grossly unfair and somewhat condescending to commonsense. THE TRUTH ABOUT WHAT CONTINUES –TO BE PRIMA FACIE SUPPORTED BY COURT STATEMENTS SUCH AS THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S– IS THAT JACKSON CONTINUES TO PURSUE AND EXPOSE DEBT COLLECTION WHITE COLLAR ACTIVITY AND COURT CORRUPTION, as those issues pertain to and effect all citizens.

2. Further, Moreover, upon the reader’s discovering that Judge Medley has never been the judge over any “litigation” matter described in the opinion other than the injunction, that glaring fact begs the question: how can it be believable that as it pertains to Barbara, any ‘written reason’ from Judge Medley, or any ruling concerning Barbara which Judge Medley has not the capacity to understand that a judgment based upon the law, and an injunction denial based upon discretion are not identical.

a. Moreover, a review of countless rulings from Medley manifest some problems. In particular, Medley’s ruling in the matter of Landiak versus Richmond, and the 4th Circuit’s agreement with Medley speaks volumes. the point being, even if Mr. Richmond erroneously interpreted the law, a judge and an appellate court is supposed to inform the public what the law is! When courts ratify any person’s scoffing, or misapprehension of the law, the person(s) ill-affected by intentional or unintentional wrongs are fostered into NEEDLESS, and sometimes bitter adversaries, while at the same such courts which protract needless controversy get to be gratified with public perks and lavish junkets. In the case of MERS v. Wells, Wells had to wait 4 years throughout a long appeal process simply just to BEGIN TO HAVE HIS DAY IN COURT because Medley threw Wells’ case out! Also, glaringly obvious is the fact that because the Circuit’s opinion for appeal of case 04-12090 sets forth that raised claims of fraud and conspiracy –and since the opinion makes it clear that Medley’s ruling only addressed denial of an injunction, if Medley wrote a hundred pages of reasons it is impossible for his “reasons” from a 5-minute injunction hearing -WITH NO SHERIFF IN APPEARANCE AT THE INJUNCTION HEARING! constitute as judgment on the merits of anything, especially when that 03-14010 debt collection lawsuit was allotted to the court of Judge Yada Magee prior to being forum-shopped to federal Judge Africk.
***This is part 1 of 2 in case some dire scheme against me is in the works. Also, I am really glad that so many of you are studying my website and looking up search words (in addition to my name). For people whose names or businesses are being searched on my website, and guilty of wrongdoing, other people are looking over your shoulders, for others who have nothing to hide, I’m sure it doesn’t matter. Here’s a sample of those searches: dale atkins / wells fargo predator / lance africk / paul rumage michigan / dean morris / new orleans sheriff paul valteau / keith doley / paul rumage new orleans / charles heck / judge lance africk / herschel adcock / dale adkins / reginald owens mortgage fraud / paul rumage medical malpractice / atlas global foreclosure / judge carolyn jefferson /sherrill david / fedex / harold doley securities / ftca scope of employment / judge carolyn gill jefferson / herschel c adcock jr baton rouge la / lori marcotte & bail bonds unlimited / dale atkins clerk of court new orleans / william planes / douglas dodd / complaint for civil rico extortion of money / stevens e moore / federal securities laws / extortion civil liability / mortgage electronic registration systems inc. / debt collection attorney wicker s office / douglas dodd middle district louisiana bankruptcy / rules of evidence louisiana / rico act as it pertains to credit collection / interrogatories to rico defendant interrogatories -jury / russell hippe / sprint communications / debt collection cases / gill jefferson / lloyd medley gina / clerk of court / jamaican sunset cle / rico filed in state court / judge dodd and brett furr / u.s. judge africk new orleans / ameriquest mortgage company valteau / gwen filosa / tort conversion suit for wrongful repossession / chase auto repo laws / herbert cade eunice / cynthia cade / argent mortgage / lasalle national bank registered agent / wendell r. miller / alma chasez hurricane katrina / freddie mac / sheriff valteau / money from a sheriff sale / paul valteau / ivan lemelle jamaican sunset / herschel c adcock jr. baton rouge la / greg marsiglia / nancy marsiglia

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ODOR -II

Because the December 20, 2006 Fourth Circuit“opinion” came from a judge it is deemed as a “judicial opinion.” HOWEVER, the res ipsa loquitur reality is that the amazing 4th Circuit illusory version of the CDC 04-12090 case cannot even be mistaken for a real judicial opinion! The “opinion” was comprised of paraphrased fusions of various Barbara Jackson cases, but NO CASE NUMBERS WERE PROVIDED. Further, unlike normal opinions, the opinion omitted the causes of action for those cases. Thus, readers of the 4th Circuit opinion have no way of knowing which claims the 4th Circuit deemed were previously adjudicated, and rendered Jackson’s appeal frivolous. Also, contrary to the 4th Circuit’s “opinion,” as fully explained on December 23, 2006 (in part 1 of 2 below), the facts and the record irrefutably negate the 4th Circuit’s implication of Judge Medley’s October 2003 injunction denial being the same as a trial of the merits of the 03-14010 case that which was never in Medley’s court.
But even more glaringly is the fact that it is unheard of (and it is laughable, especially in light of 4 misleading legal-size pages of Barbara Jackson vituperation), that the “opinion” is VOID of ANY case law or statute! Also, amazingly, appellant issues raised on appeal are also not contained in the “opinion;” and neither are the plaintiff / appellant’s (Jackson’s), nor the defendant / appellees’ briefs discussed in the December 20, 2006 “opinion.” Aside from lambasting Jackson, the other person most mentioned was the Jamaican Sunset co-owner, attorney Keith Doley, supplier of pleasure cruises to New Orleans judges.

A mere study of Black’s law dictionary, Corpus Juris Secundum, and various other legal encyclopedias and dictionaries will clearly show that an appellate “opinion” definitely is not comprised of an appeal court’s combining multiple cases and then paraphrasing as well as confusing the facts to create a frivolous case and then call the appeal frivolous. Those studies will also show that it is unheard of for case law to be excluded from an appellate opinion; and that an opinion discusses the allegations of the case rather than the circuit’s displeasure for the appellant.

A valid appeal seeks a review of error(s) of law made by a lower court. Further, despite any attempt to spin the basis for that lawsuit, the named parties and the allegations depict what the lawsuit is about and who is being sued. Moreover, reviewing courts usually reject issues and arguments attempted to become raised on appeal but are not supported by the record.

In accordance with established law, after weighing the facts, testimonies, and evidence, a trial court should render “judgment”. Not judicial preference or personality, but rather statutory law should control the judgment or opinion. Therefore, when a trial court issues a judgment contrary to law, an appeal of that judgment is NOT frivolous.

A true judicial opinion is a court’s statement of the court’s decision BASED UPON THE LAW, as well as BASED UPON THE FACTS, and the EVIDENCE contained in the record of the case.

The bottom line is that a non-identified (per curiam) Louisiana State 4th Circuit judge submitted an illusory translation of lawsuit 04-12090, and submitted incorrect information as to the actual issues of the appeal. Needless to say, the fact that the opinion referenced multiple lawsuits filed by Barbara Jackson, yet omitted any case citation which would enable readers to refer to the court record, causes reasonable inferences of intent to withhold inculpating facts.

Emphatically, who ever heard of a written appellate court opinion that did not contain one iota of stare decisis?! Or, other than this 4th Circuit, what other circuit renders an opinion without citing the cause of action that was filed in the lawsuit, but instead craft a 4-page document and call it an opinion, which –with unmasked contempt discuss the plaintiff (Barbara Jackson)? Indeed, it is unfathomable what crony macrocosm or ineptness could energize the [elite] 4th Circuit to put in writing a document as inglorious as the “opinion” of December 20, 2006!

According to Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Edition, quoting Daniel John Meador & Jordana Simone Bernstein, Appellate Courts in the United States v (1994), appellate courts “provide authoritative interpretations of statutory and constitutional provisions and control the shaping of the common law. . .” Hence, in light of the true function of an appellate court, the December 20, 2006 “opinion” from the 4th Circuit affords no benefit whatsoever to jurisprudence. Instead, that opinion corroborated things Barbara Jackson has been writing about concerning New Orleans judicial systems.

Further, the 4th Circuit “opinion” is also incorrect about Jackson appealing ANY ruling to the state supreme court. What Jackson attempted to seek from the state supreme court, to no avail, was a stay and supervision into the actions of the debt collectors as it pertained to all the list of pre-Katrina properties she supplied the court. [Jackson thought that –just as the hits on her website demonstrate visitors readily see the elephant in the room regarding questionable real estate transfers (flipping); as well as correlations of Pre-Katrina social apathy, oppression, crime, unlawful debt collection and poverty in Louisiana; and because the White Collar crime of mortgage fraud is an escalating national problem, Jackson naively thought the high court of justice would concern itself if presented with evidence of courts being used to further such social ills. Jackson did not realize the fact that Jackson had once filed a smoldering complaint about attorney Keith Doley’s incessant reprehensible conduct connected with Judge Herbert Cade’s court, the wheels of cronyism had long begun to roll against her. Also, had Jackson realized that Doley was comfortable to do such incredible conduct in court has to do with the fact that Doley supplies New Orleans judges with Jamaican Sunset cruises, she would have understood.] Facts surrounding KEITH DOLEY’S “Jamaican Sunset” and various judicial dealings are so starkly similar to the Ronald Bodenheimer-Al Copeland- Luan Hunter, Marcotte deal, it is a wonder why CORRUPTION WATCHDOGS do not investigate Doley in like manner as were Louis and Lori Marcotte’s Bail Bonds Unlimited? In fact, Orleans Parish consists of robes just as wrinkled as were those convicted in Jefferson Parish. Also, like Jefferson Parish Court, traffic court in New Orleans, New Orleans Criminal Court, New Orleans City Hall, the school system, and scores of city operations have been examined –only the New Orleans Civil Court System and Sheriff Paul Valteau’s highly questionable operations have eluded overall scrutiny. Or, perhaps corruption watchers could learn some hints from attorney Sam Dalton’s (he’s called the “Quiet Lion” by Best of New Orleans -Gambit Weekly Newspaper) perspective regarding Sheriff Harry Lee’s likely awareness of what was going on in the “WRINKLED ROBE” scandal. More discussion about “Operation Wrinkled Robe” litgation can be found in Gambit Weekly’s Cover Story: December 26, 2006. Also, to be revealed in some other forum, Barbara Jackson’s clash with Doley caused Barbara to be able to identify with Bodenheimer’s act of framing a person for harm. **Barbara’s estranged husband has also filed a complaint about Doley.] The manifest judicial prejudice, close mindedness, cronyism, and whatever else would cause a supposed court of law to ignore the longstanding pervasive illegalities associated with debt collection existed then, and appears to pale in comparison to seeming agendas to maintain and facilitate corruption, oppression, and cronyism. Notwithstanding, Barbara Jackson is filing an application to the highest state court concerning the 4th Circuit, of which I will post the merits of that application on this website. With other people’s efforts such as Jackson’s, hopefully there will be a reduction in judicial corruption and cronyism in New Orleans.